Law Enforcement Deployment Teams

Recommendations for a Rapid Response Law Enforcement Support System
Office for State and Local Law Enforcement

(1) ESTABLISHMENT- There is established in the Policy Directorate of the Department an Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, which shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement.

(2) QUALIFICATIONS- The Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement shall have an appropriate background with experience in law enforcement, intelligence, and other counterterrorism functions.

(3) ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL- The Secretary shall assign to the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement permanent staff and, as appropriate and consistent with sections 506(c)(2), 821, and 888(d), other appropriate personnel detailed from other components of the Department to carry out the responsibilities under this subsection.

(4) RESPONSIBILITIES- The Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement shall--

(A) lead the coordination of Department-wide policies relating to the role of State and local law enforcement in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters within the United States;

(B) serve as a liaison between State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and the Department;

(C) coordinate with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to ensure the intelligence and information sharing requirements of State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are being addressed;

(D) work with the Administrator to ensure that law enforcement and terrorism-focused grants to State, local, and tribal government agencies, including grants under sections 2003 and 2004, the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program, and other grants administered by the Department to support fusion centers and law enforcement-oriented programs, are appropriately focused on terrorism prevention activities;

(E) coordinate with the Science and Technology Directorate, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Justice, the National Institute of Justice, law enforcement organizations, and other appropriate entities to support the development, promulgation, and updating, as necessary, of national voluntary consensus standards for training and personal protective equipment to be used in a tactical environment by law enforcement officers; and

(F) conduct, jointly with the Administrator, a study to determine the efficacy and feasibility of establishing specialized law enforcement deployment teams to assist State, local, and tribal governments in responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters and report on the results of that study to the appropriate committees of Congress.
This project included the participation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, National Preparedness Directorate, the Office of Policy Development, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Office of Operations Coordination. It also included the participation of the U.S. Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The views and opinions herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The National Terrorism Policy Center was established by Congress to foster a dialogue about new approaches to the threat of terrorism. Established in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Preparedness Directorate, the National Terrorism Policy Center provides funding for projects to strengthen the efforts by State and local public safety agencies to protect the American people from both domestic and international terrorism.

The mission of the center is to establish a national forum for senior State and local law enforcement officials to engage in joint policy development, strategic planning and interagency coordination. The center focuses on all aspects of the terrorist threat—including prevention, detection, apprehension and first responder policies.

In this report, Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs from the Nation’s major metropolitan areas have joined together to identify issues and provide recommendations on the development of Law Enforcement Deployment Teams. Recognizing a national need, this effort represents the unity of purpose and common commitment by law enforcement agencies to protect the public they serve.
Forward

This report was developed by the Major Cities Chiefs Association, representing law enforcement in the largest metropolitan areas of the United States, and the seven major Canadian jurisdictions. Conducted in partnership with the Major County Sheriffs Association, the program recommended in this report will be a combined effort of police officers and sheriffs’ deputies across the Nation. Implementation of these proposals will strengthen prevention, protection, response and recovery from both terrorism and natural disasters as well.

The Major Cities Chiefs Association thanks the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for both leadership and support, without which this unprecedented effort would not have been possible.
Executive Workshop

August 21-23, 2007

Chief Gil Kerlikowske
MCC Vice President
Seattle Police Dept.

Sheriff Doug Gillespie*
MCC Homeland Security Committee Chairman
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.

Policies and Procedures Working Group
Chairman: Director Robert Parker
Miami-Dade Police Dept.

Sheriff Ted Sexton
Tuscaloosa County (AL) Sheriffs Dept.

Assistant Chief Darrin Palmer
Prince George’s Co. Police Dept.

Deputy Chief David Graham
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dept.

Deputy Chief Cathy Suey
Las Vegas Metro Police Dept.

Deputy Chief Ted Moody
Las Vegas Metro Police Dept.

Major Mike Ronczkowski
Miami-Dade Police Dept.

Mr. Craig Ferrell
Dept. Director, Admin. General Counsel
Houston Police Dept.

Mr. Marko Bourne
Director of Policy
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

Team Composition Working Group
Chairman: Sheriff Lee Baca*
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dept.

Chief Robert Davis
San Jose Police Dept.

Chief Heather Fong
San Francisco Police Dept.

Chief Roy Henderson*
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office

Commissioner Sylvester Johnson
Philadelphia Police Dept.

Chief William Lansdowne
San Diego Police Dept.

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Mr. Dan Lipka
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Mr. Mark Martin
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Orange County (FL) Sheriffs Dept.

Lt. Roger Dixon
Fort Worth Police Department

Mr. Craig Caldwell
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

Mr. James Chapparo
Office of Intelligence and Analysis
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Mr. Kyle Blackman
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

Mr. Kevin Saupp
National Preparedness Directorate
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Mr. David Berrisford
Minnesota Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Mr. Tom Frazier
Major Cities Chiefs Association

Lafayette Group
Staff Support

* Major County Sheriffs Association Member
Major Cities Chiefs Association

Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC; President
Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle, WA; Vice President

Founded in 1966 with only eight police departments, the Major Cities Chiefs Association today represents every major city in the United States and seven Canadian jurisdictions. Established to address the unique needs and priorities of law enforcement in our Nation’s largest metropolitan areas, the Association focuses solely on policy issues of critical concern to Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs. A key feature of Association meetings is the “Chiefs Roundtable,” a forum for exchanging lessons learned by law enforcement executives.
Major County Sheriffs Association

Sheriff James Karnes, Franklin Co., OH; President
Sheriff Michael S. Carona, Orange Co., CA; Vice President

Sheriff Gregory Ahern, Alameda Co., CA
Acting Sheriff William Mullen, Allegheny Co., PA
Sheriff Grayson Robinson, Arapahoe Co., CO
Sheriff John Anderson, Baltimore City, MD
Sheriff R. Jay Fisher, Baltimore Co., MD
Sheriff Leo McGuire, Bergen Co., NJ
Sheriff Darren P. White, Bernalillo Co., NM
Sheriff Ralph Lopez, Bexar Co., TX
Sheriff Jack Parker, Brevard Co., FL
Sheriff Thomas M. Hodgson, Bristol Co., MA
Sheriff Kenneth Jenne, Broward Co., FL
Sheriff Douglas Gillespie, Clark Co., NV
Sheriff Neil Warren, Cobb Co., GA
Sheriff Warren Rupf, Contra Costa Co., CA
Sheriff Thomas Dart, Cook Co., IL
Sheriff Gerald McFaul, Cuyahoga Co., OH
Sheriff Lupe Valdez, Dallas Co., TX
Sheriff Daron Hall, Davidson Co., TN
Sheriff Thomas Brown, DeKalb Co., GA
Sheriff Fred Oliva, Denver Co., CO
Sheriff John Zaruba, DuPage Co., IL
Sheriff John Rutherford, Duval Co., FL
Sheriff Leo Samaniego, El Paso Co., TX
Sheriff Terry Maketa, El Paso Co., CO
Sheriff Timothy B. Howard, Erie Co., NY
Sheriff Frank Cousins, Jr., Essex Co., MA
Sheriff Stan Barry, Fairfax Co., VA
Sheriff James Karnes, Franklin Co., OH
Sheriff Margaret Mims, Fresno Co., CA
Sheriff Myron Freeman, Fulton Co., GA
Sheriff Simon Leis, Hamilton Co., OH
Sheriff Tommy Thomas, Harris Co., TX
Sheriff Richard Stanek, Hennepin Co., MN
Sheriff Lupe Trevino, Hidalgo Co., TX
Sheriff David Gee, Hillsborough Co., FL
Sheriff Joe Cassidy, Hudson Co., NJ
Sheriff Thomas Phillips, Jackson Co., MO
Sheriff Mike Hale, Jefferson Co., AL
Sheriff John Aubrey, Jefferson Co., KY
Sheriff Ted Mink, Jefferson Co., CO
Sheriff Frank Denning, Johnson Co., KS
Sheriff Larry Steima, Kent Co., MI
Sheriff Donny Youngblood, Kern Co., CA
Sheriff Sue Rahr, King Co., WA
Sheriff Gary Del Re, Lake Co., IL
Sheriff Leroy Baca, Los Angeles Co., CA
Sheriff Mark Hackel, Macomb Co., MI
Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, Maricopa Co., AZ
Sheriff Frank Anderson, Marion Co., IN
Sheriff James Pendergraph, Mecklenburg Co., NC
Sheriff Joseph Spicuzzo, Middlesex Co., NJ
Sheriff James DiPaola, Middlesex Co., MA
Sheriff David A. Clarke Jr., Milwaukee Co., WI
Sheriff Joseph O’xley, Monmouth Co., NJ
Sheriff Patrick O’Flynn, Monroe Co., NY
Sheriff Dave Vore, Montgomery Co., PA
Sheriff John Durante, Montgomery Co., PA
Sheriff Bernie Giusto, Multnomah Co., OR
Sheriff Michael Bellotti, Norfolk Co., MA
Sheriff Michael Bouchard, Oakland Co., MI
Sheriff John Whetser, Oklahoma Co., OK
Sheriff Kevin Beary, Orange Co., FL
Sheriff Michael S. Carona, Orange Co., CA
Sheriff Rick Bradshaw, Palm Beach Co., FL
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Sheriff Jim Cotes, Pinellas Co., FL
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Sheriff Warren Evans, Wayne Co., MI
Sheriff Thomas Belfiore, Westchester Co., NY

Joe Wolfinger, Executive Director

Law Enforcement Deployment Teams
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Background

The United States has never established a national police force. Throughout American history, the public has relied upon State and local law enforcement during every emergency and disaster, no matter how catastrophic. While the Federal Government has established agencies and procedures for national defense, criminal investigation and other essential services – there is no national police agency responsible for public protection and maintaining the rule of law.

While this uniquely American approach has served the public well for most of our history, it has not provided an effective, rapid and massive law enforcement response to a natural or man-made inter-state or regional even. Never was this need more apparent and disturbing than during the tragic weeks of Hurricane Katrina. As the U.S. Senate noted, Hurricane Katrina showed a:

“failure to act on the lessons of past catastrophes, both man-made and natural, that demonstrated the need for a large, well-equipped, and coordinated law enforcement response to maintain or restore civil order after catastrophic events.”

Law enforcement agencies in the path of Katrina and Rita were completely overwhelmed. In Mississippi and Louisiana, the storm caused massive damage to police and sheriffs’ cars and stations, emergency response vehicles, and emergency operations centers. Police departments in the storm’s path lost their dispatch and communication functions, administrative capabilities, and jails to confine arrested suspects. Additional burdens were then imposed on the law enforcement, such as search and rescue, which took priority over normal police duties.

It was an extraordinary and unprecedented breakdown in emergency management. The National Guard arrived. Federal law enforcement personnel were brought to provide law enforcement services. Law Enforcement teams from around the country began to self-dispatch. Although these actions clearly were meant to help, they often caused further chaos and confusion, and had the potential to turn emergency workers into storm victims as well.

For disaster recovery and medical assistance, communities may receive emergency assistance from programs supported by the Federal government. Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) has, since 1989, been dispatching elite search-and-rescue teams to conduct operations in everything from collapsed buildings to catastrophic earthquakes. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) provide emergency medical services. These groups of professional and

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para-professional personnel provide life-saving assistance during a disaster.

In the wake of Katrina, Congress has asked: Why doesn’t law enforcement have rapid response teams like US&R and DMAT to provide near-immediate support during a catastrophic event, regardless of what caused it?

This question becomes even more critical when one examines what set Hurricane Katrina apart from events like the terrorist attacks of September 11 or the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City. In New York, Washington D.C., Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, the public safety-emergency management infrastructure remained intact. Incoming support teams took their missions from on-site incident management personnel, whose knowledge of the area, the incident, and what was required to address it came from their experience on the ground. There was a structure and a system still in place to assess damage and direct the efforts of incoming support teams.

What made Katrina different was that the public safety and emergency management systems were destroyed. This devastating destruction underscores the need for large and independent teams, complete self-sufficient and able to provide a broad range of public safety functions.

“Chiefs and Sheriffs are deeply grateful for all that the Congress has done to support American law enforcement. Law Enforcement Deployment Teams are the latest step toward securing a safer America.”

Darrel Stephens, President, Major Cities Chiefs
# LEDT Components

**A Law Enforcement Deployment Team:** May provide both response and recovery as well as prevention and protection support. The teams should be...

- Established consistent with FEMA regions.
- Comprised of no more than 500 personnel each, in modular components.
- Provide essential law enforcement support (e.g. patrol and crowd control).
- Provide advanced and specialized skills (e.g. SWAT).
- Include related emergency support personnel (e.g. communications, logistics) capabilities.
- Stand alone as self-sufficient units capable of sustained operations for 14 days.
- Arrive at the disaster site with all necessary equipment (weapons, PPE, interoperable communications).
- Consist of modular components enabling complete teams or individual components to be deployed from multiple regions.
- Display standardized credentials and uniform identification that is recognized by all authorities.
- "Typed" to meet minimum training, experience, equipment and performance standards.
- Report to the local Incident Commander, consistent with the NIMS and ICS.
- Deployed pursuant to EMAC requests for assistance and reimbursements.
The Proposed Approach

Responding to a domestic disaster in an all-hazards approach is a key focus of local, State and Federal organizations. Hurricane Katrina highlighted the fact that a significant or catastrophic incident can quickly overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to carry out basic public safety functions. In extreme cases, entire regions can be left without any law enforcement services at all.

A national plan would include teams that are trained, equipped, and ready for near-immediate dispatch. The structure of such a system should build on the success of similar programs, such as US&R and DMAT. Divided according to existing FEMA regions, teams should be scalable, flexible, and self-supporting for a specific period of time. Team members should carry weapons, and have the authority to detain or arrest and use force, including deadly force, if necessary. They should operate with the same rights and immunities of officers in the affected state. LEDTs should also have ready access to the widest possible array of resources pre-positioned around the country to make them readily transportable to the incident site.

The command structure should follow the National Incident Management System (NIMS), where the teams take their missions through the Unified Command Structure and the on-site incident commander.

The teams should most likely leverage the EMAC system. These state-to-state compacts, which exist under the non-profit National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), cover liability, the honoring of law enforcement credentials from state to state, and financial reimbursement. However, there is a need to streamline existing EMAC procedures to enable the rapid deployment of LEDTs.

“What the police will have to do is maintain order and control.”

Chief Richard J. Pennington, Atlanta Police Department, as quoted on CNN.com, September 1, 2005
A National Plan

Legislation to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission will establish an Office for State and Local Law Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Congress has directed the new office to conduct a study jointly with the Administrator of FEMA to determine the “efficacy and feasibility” of a national plan for “Law Enforcement Teams.”

On August 21-23, 2007 representatives from the nation’s largest law enforcement agencies hosted an executive workshop to discuss an approach. Representatives from the Major Cities Chiefs Association, Major Counties Sheriff’s Association, the National Sheriffs’ Association, DHS, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) met to develop the framework of a nationally deployable law enforcement contingent that would have the ability to restore and maintain civil order after a significant event. State and local law enforcement officers are uniquely trained and experienced and provide the best option in working with the impacted communities to restore and maintain the peace after such an event.

This report is the product of that partnership. It shows the need for such a program, and gives DHS consolidated input from the nation’s largest law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement executives have referred to the concept as “Law Enforcement Rapid Response Teams.” Congress has adopted the term “Law Enforcement Deployment Teams,” the term used throughout this report.

To Establish a National Plan

Figure #1

This report is organized by the process stages shown here:

- Mission
- Team Composition
- Coordination Mechanisms
- Deployment Phases
- Management Models
- Next Steps
Law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, were more than willing to provide support in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. But help was sporadic and not well planned, providing little continuity beyond the immediate needs of the response community. This influx of support wasn’t always in line with the real-time needs of incident commanders, and therefore slowed decision-making and created inconsistent levels of response.

Had LEDT teams been established prior to Katrina, they could have played a significant operational role. As a rapidly deployable, nationally coordinated, scalable law enforcement resource, the LEDT plan should provide reliable and consistent support throughout response and recovery operations until the conclusion of the event. The need to develop such a network is obvious.

Mission Statement
Preparation of this report was predicated upon an agreed mission statement:

To provide professional and coordinated law enforcement resources to ensure the nation’s civil well-being in an all-hazards environment.
Law Enforcement Deployment Teams

Organization is paramount following a major incident, and a national LEDT system should provide a professional and coordinated law enforcement response with the ability to restore order and ensure the community’s civil well-being. In both notice and no notice events, there are three specific categories in which LEDTs are anticipated to be mobilized and deployed:

- **Natural disasters**
- **Manmade and terrorist incidents**
- **High threat situations**

LEDTs should be deployed to supplement a variety of regional public safety capabilities.

**RESPONSE**

When an area has been overwhelmed by a disaster or incident, LEDTs should provide response support after the fact.

**PREVENTION/PREPAREDNESS**

LEDTs could also provide critical prevention services before an event, such as an imminent terrorist threat (i.e. increase of the Homeland Security Advisory System) or a special event (National Special Security Event such as the Republican or Democratic National Conventions).

**All Hazards Approach**

The LEDT mission incorporates the established DHS all-hazards policy. Accordingly, a national LEDT system will be comprised of standardized skill sets, including traditional law enforcement and corrections capabilities. By leveraging the expertise of the nation’s law enforcement community, LEDTs will have advanced capabilities such as explosive detection and special weapons and tactics (SWAT). The establishment of specialized teams within the LEDT framework will allow impacted areas to request specific law enforcement related capabilities depending on need. The capabilities of LEDTs must be integrated into national all-hazards planning efforts and be capable of operating in all environments.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

A national LEDT system will be composed of State and local law enforcement agencies, primarily local police and sheriff’s departments. There should be no requirement to participate; LEDTs should only be comprised of agencies who wish to volunteer. It is expected that the largest agencies will provide significant support and leadership; smaller agencies should be encouraged to participate to the greatest extent possible. LEDTs will not include Federal law enforcement officers, whose role is defined by Federal Emergency Support Function (ESF) 13.

LEDTs must fit within the Incident Command System (ICS) as outlined by NIMS. Teams will fall under the command of the local incident.
commander, and will not operate independently.

The vehicle recommended for LEDT deployments is the existing Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which allows states to request and give assistance to one another. EMAC requests are state to state mutual aid agreements. This will serve to activate the LEDTs and then DHS would participate in partnership with the law enforcement agencies to manage the deployment and operations.

It is understood that the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement would be responsible for the policy, planning and management of the LEDTs, in close coordination with FEMA. At the time of activation, it is understood that FEMA would assume the operational role of coordination in the field, to ensure that any deployed LEDTs would operate in concert with other FEMA activities such as PEP and USARS.

Another potential for partnership exists in the private sector. Relationships within each LEDT region and across regions are encouraged. Private sector partners can provide significant logistical and resource support.

**National Guard**

The National Guard has always been a vital partner with police and sheriff agencies during major crises. The mission of the National Guard and its current structure are compatible with a national LEDT system.

Each state’s National Guard and the Department of Defense (DOD) have access to a great number of resources that can support the LEDT mission, including personnel, medical supplies, heavy equipment, and logistics infrastructure. The National Guard’s Civil Support Teams have valuable capabilities local level agencies do not posses. The Guard also has extensive experience in building and managing detention centers, a critical need in the event that local jails are incapacitated.

Title 32 of the U.S. Code limits the role of the National Guard by prohibiting it from providing certain law enforcement functions, a gap to be filled by the national LEDT strategy. The role of the DOD and the National Guard in a LEDT system will require further study by the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement and the Administrator of FEMA.
**LEDT Team Composition**

**Regional Framework**

A national LEDT system should be decentralized and based on a regional framework. To ensure coordination with FEMA, it is proposed that the 10 FEMA regions should form the foundation for the national LEDT strategy. Each region may have multiple, scalable LEDTs. The number of teams per region will vary based on participation, available resources and need. Figure #2 identifies each FEMA region along with existing FEMA logistics centers, and the location of Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) teams. These resources largely correspond with Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County Sheriff’s Association membership, which constitute the 100 largest law enforcement agencies nationally. As the likely home for most of the teams, these agencies have the depth of experience and are large enough to provide the majority of LEDT personnel. This approach affords a balanced distribution of assets to the overall LEDT system.

“*We are working to ensure that lessons learned are implemented in our future Emergency Preparedness Plan.*”

Superintendent Warren Riley, New Orleans, LA as quoted in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 6, 2006, 2 p.m.

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**Urban Search and Rescue**

Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) task forces have been established for location, rescue, and initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces as the result of a structural collapse or a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, hurricane, tornado, flood, a technological accident, terrorist incident, or a hazardous material release. The existing 28 US&R task forces are trained and administered by FEMA, which deploys the three closest task forces within six hours of notification, and additional teams as necessary. The role of these task forces is to support State and local emergency responders’ efforts to locate victims and manage recovery operations.

Each task force consists of two 31-person teams, four canines, and a comprehensive equipment cache. A typical task force generally has more than 130 highly-trained members, including firefighters, engineers, medical professionals, canine/handler teams, and emergency managers with special training in urban search-and-rescue environments.

The equipment cache, which includes medical, rescue, communications, technical support and logistics equipment, allows the incident site to be a construction site, communications center, high-tech engineering firm, mobile emergency room, and a camp, all rolled into one. It also allows the task force to be self-sufficient for up to four days.
National Resources

Figure #2

[Map of the United States showing regions and locations marked with stars and dots, including major cities and FEMA Logistics Centers.]
Team Size

No single LEDT will be comprised of more than 500 total personnel, recognizing that at any given time not all members will be deployable. Any larger and the teams could constitute a logistics burden and could delay rapid deployment. In regions where 500 would be burdensome, a smaller team of approximately 250 may be assembled to ensure a rapid response. The emphasis is on developing scalable and flexible teams, thus enabling the deployment of the specific assets that meet the needs of the incident commander. Teams can be deployed independently or in concert with other teams.

Additionally, LEDTs will be modular, enabling individual components or specific skill sets to be deployed. It is proposed that the LEDT plan not require an entire team to be deployed, but only those elements that meet the needs of the local incident commander.

Deployments of individual team components would be limited to fourteen (14) days. This will reduce the burden on host agencies and decrease the impact of stress and fatigue on LEDT personnel.

Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) consist of volunteer groups affiliated with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a cooperative asset-sharing program among Federal government agencies, State and local governments, and private businesses and civilian volunteers. DMATs ensure medical resources are available following a disaster that overwhelms the local health care system.

DMATs are categorized according to their ability to respond. A Level-1 DMAT can be ready to deploy within 8 hours of notification and remain self-sufficient for 72 hours with enough food, water, shelter and medical supplies to treat about 250 patients per day. Level-2 DMATs lack enough equipment to make them self-sufficient, but can deploy and replace a Level-1 team by utilizing and supplementing equipment on site.

DMATs generally are locally sponsored and community based. Many are local or State assets prior to being a Federal asset. They maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Federal government so they can be called upon when necessary. Team members thus can be “Federalized” upon activation, which provides team members with licensure and certification anywhere in the Federal domain, and solves liability and workers compensation issues.

When deployed, the DMAT functions under a Management Support Unit (MSU) in accordance with the Incident Command System. The MSU responds rapidly to the disaster area, and provides management support to deployed DMATs by interfacing with the local disaster management system.
Team Capabilities

Each LEDT will have a core set of law enforcement-related capabilities. The degree of specialized expertise will vary from team to team, but the goal is to have a system capable of providing law enforcement support for multiple scenarios, in particular the DHS National Planning Scenarios.

Figure #3 provides an example of core and specialty capabilities for each LEDT. The modular nature enables incident commanders to fill specific resource gaps as needed. Appendix A and B represent two law enforcement typing systems that may assist in the establishment of a national law enforcement typing system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPABILITIES</th>
<th>SKILL SET</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Law Enforcement</td>
<td>General public safety and law enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crowd and riot control</td>
<td>Crowd management and dispersal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications support</td>
<td>Interoperable communications with technicians and dispatch personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Custody teams</td>
<td>Jail operations and detainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advance teams</td>
<td>Incident assessment and operations planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language Communications</td>
<td>Fluency in multiple foreign languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>Equipment and supply management, and team logistics support pre, trans, and post deployments</td>
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<tr>
<th>CAPABILITIES</th>
<th>SKILL SET</th>
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<td>Special weapons and tactics</td>
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<td>Hazardous Materials Identification and handling</td>
<td>HAZMAT teams</td>
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<td>Bicycle teams</td>
<td>Area patrol and crowd control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycle teams</td>
<td>Area patrol and crowd control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Safety Dive Teams</td>
<td>Water rescue, area security, and vulnerability assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Security Rescue</td>
<td>Water patrol and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure vulnerability</td>
<td>Critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canine Teams</td>
<td>Narcotics, cadaver, and explosive detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence collection and analysis</td>
<td>Cover surveillance, information, and intelligence analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation Teams</td>
<td>Criminal investigation, e.g. robbery, homicide, etc.</td>
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</table>
An EMAC request through the Governor of the requesting state, and coordinated with DHS, would result in a comprehensive package, consisting of modular capabilities that meet the needs on the ground.

LEDTs also should have incident management system expertise. After Katrina, some responding agencies were given a designated area of operations and charged with carrying out all law enforcement duties. In this kind of situation, a LEDT incident management team could establish command and control in places where the law enforcement/public safety infrastructure has broken down. One advantage of LEDT organization based on FEMA Regions is the availability of Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) in each region that can work closely and support the regional LEDT upon request.

Another key component of the LEDT program is the inclusion of Advance Teams that collect information from the incident site. This enables the continuous adjustment of LEDT resources as the environment and mission changes. Each region should have primary and secondary Advance Teams capable of immediate deployment.

Building on these capabilities, Figure #4, developed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, provides a conceptual overview of the potential LEDT components. Ultimately, the LEDT structure must be fully compliant with and integrated with ICS. Not all LEDTs will be comprised of every capability shown here, but will draw from the expertise within each region. Modularity will enable individual components to be deployed from multiple LEDTs.

**Equipment**

A key to the success of the LEDT program will be the standardization of equipment. Work that has already been done to identify the appropriate equipment should be leveraged to the greatest extent possible. DHS efforts to type equipment must also be leveraged. It is expected that LEDTs will bring certain equipment with them (e.g., weapons), and that other items will be supplied by modular equipment caches. There will be some variation, but the majority of the items will be standardized across the equipment caches. Understanding that it is faster and easier to move personnel than it is to move equipment and supplies, standardization and modularly compartmented equipment will enable LEDTs to be deployed independently and connect with equipment from the most appropriate cache. The expansion of FEMA Logistics equipment caches or the Preposition Equipment Program (PEP) centers would allow LEDT equipment resources to be further integrated into national equipment logistics operations; it would be critical that the deployment of LEDT equipment caches from FEMA be seamlessly integrated and coordinated with LEDT personnel activation.

Embedding the equipment within host agencies would allow LEDT personnel to work with, train and maintain their equipment. A combination of locations may be appropriate. No matter where the caches are located, it is critical that they be ready for deployment to support any team at any time.

Each LEDT will be self-sustaining and deployments will be tailored to each situation and will be sensitive to the stress endured by team members.

“The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, like other police departments, had to adjust to the circumstances of September 11, 2001 — dealing with terrorism at the local law enforcement level.”

Sheriff Douglas Gillespie, MCC Homeland Security Committee Chairman, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.
This model was developed by the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department.
Interoperable Communications

Interoperability is the ability of agencies to work together toward common ends. Wireless communications interoperability specifically refers to the ability of emergency response officials to share information via voice and data signals on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized.

The lack of interoperable communications was cited as a major failure in the response to Hurricane Katrina. For this reason, LEDTs must have tactical interoperable communications—the rapid provision of on-scene, incident based, mission-critical voice communications among first responder agencies. In extreme cases, LEDTs will be deployed to a region where all communication infrastructure has been destroyed. LEDTs may need the equipment and training to provide interoperable communications across agencies and disciplines for an entire region. In less severe cases, a critical need is for LEDTs to tap into existing communication networks so that they can communicate with the incident commander and local agencies.

FEMA is expanding its ability to support interoperable communications, Incident Response Vehicles (IRV) are capable of restoring designated mutual aid frequencies and are designed to form a “mesh network.” IRV are smaller than earlier communication platforms and are capable of being flown or driven to impacted areas within 12 hours.

Programs like DHS’s Interoperable Communication Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) could be leveraged to ensure first responder agencies across the country have the necessary interoperable communications equipment and training. ICTAP is a technical assistance program designed to enhance public safety interoperability with regard to an all-hazard disaster. The program works to provide first responders and agencies with the ability to communicate when and where required. ICTAP leverages existing Federal, State, and local on-going efforts when possible and provides end-to-end planning, system design, implementation, and follow-up services to States and Urban Areas.

Critical equipment, like communications, must be interoperable. LEDTs must have the ability to communicate with local agencies. In some cases, they may have to act as hubs for all law enforcement communications. This will require the ability to set up temporary communication networks. LEDT personnel must also be able to communicate with each other; standardized communication equipment will facilitate this kind of interoperability. Recently deployed FEMA Incident Response Vehicles (IRV) are designed to provide mesh network interoperable communication support on nationally established mutual aid frequencies and must establish ongoing partnership with LEDT within their area of operations prior to LEDT deployment.

A fundamental question in the development of a national LEDT system is the equipment source, i.e., where LEDT equipment will come from and where it will be stored. There are several national response programs already in existence that the national LEDT system can leverage, although none of them are focused on law enforcement. As part of the PEP, for example, DHS has equipment caches that could be rapidly deployed. In addition, there are 28 US&R caches around the country supported by
DHS and maintained by local agencies. FEMA also has large stores of disaster response equipment located regionally in logistics centers.

Efficiency and the ability to deploy rapidly are two important considerations, as LEDTs will be significantly bigger than US&R teams and will require more logistical management support. Regional stockpiles may not be enough, and a detailed analysis of existing equipment stockpiles should be conducted to evaluate options for the development of equipment caches within each FEMA region. After a thorough evaluation, a strategic decision on location and scope of equipment caches must be made.

**Training and Exercise**

As multi-agency and multi-skilled teams, LEDTs will require significant training. The emphasis will be on the standardization of skills, thus creating a baseline level of capability. A national training and exercise program should be developed in support of the LEDT system.

Building on the regional approach, training centers located in each LEDT

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**FEMA Logistics Centers**

There are eight logistics centers in the continental U.S. and three off shore storage sites. These centers support first responders with all the equipment needed to manage an emergency situation. They also provide life-saving and life-sustaining resources to states that need them for disaster victims.

The centers are located near Atlanta, GA; Berryville, VA; Cumberland, MD; Ft. Worth, TX; Frederick, MD; and San Jose, CA. The three offshore storage sites are located in Guam, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

Most of the centers provide resources such as blankets, meals ready-to-eat (MRE’s)/Emergency Meals, bottled water, generators, cots, tarps, and Blue Roof sheeting all of which can be distributed through state and county distribution points in time of need.

In addition to the equipment listed above, the Berryville, VA, center stores and maintains computer equipment and electronics mainly for disaster field office operations and the Frederick, MD, center provides emergency medical supplies and equipment for emergency medical operations.
region could address operational training needs, including specific skill development. Training should also address administrative tasks, such as request and reimbursement procedures. An exercise program should test LEDT readiness and ensure compatibility with NIMS and ICS. DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center should be a natural partner in this effort.

**LEDT Resource Database**

It is proposed that the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement, FEMA and NEMA collaboratively develop a Resource Database to catalog team capabilities, equipment and training. This will serve as a comprehensive listing of the national response resources, organized by region. The database could be used for advance planning and development of specific response schemes, based on specific threats and disaster scenarios. The database can also be used to track resources deployed during events and as part of the reimbursement process once teams are demobilized. With capabilities of each LEDT contained in the Resource Database, EMAC agreements could be made quickly and LEDT deployments would be tailored to meet the needs of the incident commander. As minimum training certifications would be included, gaps in skill sets can be systematically identified and rectified.
**Preposition Equipment Program (PEP)**

PEP consists of standardized equipment pods that are prepositioned in selected geographic areas to permit rapid deployment to States and localities. Highly specialized equipment and frequently used off-the-shelf items are stored in pods, transportable by land or air after help is requested. This equipment is specifically tailored to sustain and reconstitute the capabilities of State and local first responders. Through formal request and deployment procedures, DHS will transfer PEP pods to specifically designated State or local officials.

PEP sites are strategically placed throughout the country. These equipment pods are available to respond to incidents in most major populated areas across the continental U.S.. In the event of a disaster, PEP immediately transports one pod and its team of support staff by ground or air. If circumstances warrant a greater level of support, DHS will dispatch additional, fully-equipped pods.

PEP Equipment Set: Each PEP equipment set includes devices, tools, supplies, and additional material most likely needed to support the initial response to a major incident in a large metropolitan area. PEP equipment is supplied to replenish and reconstitute 100 fire/HAZMAT, 25 emergency medical, and 25 law enforcement personnel conducting emergency response operations in the hot zone at the incident site. The following are examples of types of equipment that are provided as a part of PEP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):</strong></th>
<th><strong>Search Equipment:</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Fire fighting &amp; bomb suits</td>
<td>• Telescoping search camera</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Level A, B + BC suits</td>
<td>• Seismic/acoustic listening devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Respiratory protection</td>
<td>• Thermal imager</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Nomex jumpsuits &amp; chemical resistant gloves</td>
<td>• Electric current detectors</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Detection Equipment:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Medical Equipment/Supplies:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Dosimeters &amp; radiation survey meters</td>
<td>• Defibrillators</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 4-gas &amp; PID monitoring devices</td>
<td>• Antidotal medications</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Chemical agent point detectors</td>
<td>• Oxygen regulators &amp; respirators</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Biological agent air samplers</td>
<td>• Disposable towels/cotton towels</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Biological Immunoassay screening strips</td>
<td><strong>Communication Equipment:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personal CO monitors</td>
<td>• Level A in-suit communications links</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Decontamination Equipment:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Additional Equipment:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Full tent system</td>
<td>• Small support equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Misting system</td>
<td>• Logistics/transportation equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Heaters and litters</td>
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</table>

**Law Enforcement Deployment Teams**
Policies, procedures, and coordination requirements should be developed with the understanding that LEDT will not disrupt or usurp intra-state mutual aid agreements or processes.

Two of the main mechanisms through which law enforcement support could be provided are EMAC, which is managed by NEMA, and the National Response Framework Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security.²

EMAC

EMAC is an established nationwide state to state mutual aid mechanism that may be utilized by the LEDT system. The EMAC Articles of Agreement, which have been approved by all states and most U.S. territories, is a standard framework that addresses questions of reimbursement, liability, and honoring of law enforcement credentials across state lines, as well as protection under workers’ compensation and liability.¹ Once the conditions for providing assistance have been set between the requesting and responding agencies, those terms constitute a legally binding agreement that makes the requesting state responsible for reimbursement.

EMAC was credited with facilitating the deployment of significant resources to areas of Louisiana and Mississippi impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. EMAC worked successfully; however, the number of requests and subsequent paperwork quickly overwhelmed the system. A comprehensive LEDT plan will simplify and clarify requests for law enforcement assistance between states.

¹http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/
²http://www.emacweb.org/?9
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)

How EMAC Works
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a mutual aid agreement between states that allows them to send assistance – personnel and equipment – to one another in event of a natural or man-made disaster. Administered by NEMA, it is intended to dispense with bureaucratic wrangling by allowing states to ask for whatever assistance they need in any type of emergency.

Once the requesting and responding states agree to the conditions for providing help, the terms of that agreement constitute a legally binding contract that makes the requesting state responsible for reimbursement, and protects personnel under worker’s compensation and liability provisions. EMAC does not replace Federal assistance, but can be used alongside Federal help or when Federal assistance is not warranted.

1. Disaster occurs.
2. The Governor of the affected state issues a disaster declaration.
4. Resources are requested through EMAC network.
5. A binding agreement is established between states.
6. Assistance is provided by other states.

ESF 13
ESF #13 is a mechanism for coordinating Federal-to-Federal support or Federal support to state and local authorities. As currently written in the National Response Framework, ESF #13 states, “While State, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities have primary responsibility for public safety and security, ESF #13 provides Federal public safety and security assistance to support preparedness, response, and recovery priorities in circumstances where locally available resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate, or where a unique Federal capability is required.” This includes non-investigative/ non-criminal law enforcement, public safety and security during potential or actual incidents. ESF #13 capabilities support incident management, critical infrastructure protection, security planning and technical assistance, technology support, and public safety in both pre-incident and post-incident situations.

EMAC and ESF #13 are not mutually exclusive. Both can be utilized at the same time during the same incident. What is important to remember is that ESF #13 only provides Federal law enforcement assistance. It does not deploy a team of uniformed law enforcement personnel who are skilled in disaster response to restore order at the local level. This makes the EMAC process a better mechanism for LEDT deployment.

**Intra State Mutual Aid**

Interagency coordination in the form of Interagency Agreements (IAA), Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) are currently used to shorten the time between request and fulfillment. Because these agreements have been established prior to a disaster, they articulate support requirements in advance. For this reason, these pre-packaged mechanisms will continue to play an important role.

**Law Enforcement Checklist**

The Chiefs and Sheriffs have worked closely with NEMA to finalize the EMAC Law Enforcement Checklist (Appendix C). The Checklist recommends core requirements that should be addressed on the REQA form. The checklist provides a common language that can be easily understood among participating and coordinating organizations. Every agency should use the checklist as a starting point in order to address the specifics of their request, and to increase the speed of administrative processing.
“There’s some important things to remember about not communicating a sense of fear or a sense of panic to people. The face of the local official, their mayor, their police chief, at times, their governor is the face of local government that people want to trust. It really won’t be the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense.”

Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Vice President Major Cities Chiefs, Chief of Police Seattle Police Department, as quoted in Online News Hour, Sept. 26, 2005

Deployment Phases

The LEDT cycle will consist of four stages:
- Pre-Event
- Mobilization
- Operations, and
- Demobilization

Multiple resources should be utilized to fully develop the policies and procedures required for each phase of the LEDT deployment cycle, including but not limited to:
- The Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Manual
- EMAC Articles of Agreement
- Joint Field Office Activation and Operations -- Interagency Integrated Standing Operating Procedure

Pre-Event

Prior coordination between organizations in the pre-event stage is absolutely essential to minimize response time during a disaster. To this end, outreach and education programs will increase awareness of LEDT’s response capabilities. These programs should be focused on potential incident commanders as well as State and local representatives involved in coordinating disaster and emergency management.

The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement will be thoroughly involved in reviewing current notice and no notice threats, and should ensure all stakeholders are aware of the LEDT system. For events that occur with notice, specific LEDT elements will be engaged so that they are able to tailor their preparation for deployment. Policies affecting the pre-deployment of LEDT elements, including authority, funding and incident duration, will need to be further defined.

MAINTENANCE

Pre-event equipment maintenance procedures must be established. These should cover equipment readiness, storage, management and resupply.

TRAINING

Lessons learned and best practices from training and actual deployments will be incorporated into pre-event training. Additional training and exercises that cover the EMAC system and the request process will also be conducted. The funding mechanism for training and testing will need to be further defined.

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6 http://www.emacweb.org
Mobilization

Requests for assistance may be submitted by State and local officials through their established state process, and then through EMAC to fill the request in coordination with FEMA and the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, each of which would have access to mobilization timetables for each LEDT as well as the LEDT Resource Database. Requesting agencies could choose from the list of typed and credentialed teams established (Figure 3) including:

- Patrol Operations
- Crowd Control
- Explosive Detection
- Custody and Corrections – with mobile detention centers
- Incident Management – Staff to support ICS and mobile command center
- Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
- Hazardous Materials Identification and Handling
- Aviation Support – fixed wing and helicopter assets
- Investigative Teams

It is crucial that LEDT management participate in identification of needs. If advance teams are dispatched, they may collect critical information regarding needs and priorities at the scene. NIMS and ICS may be utilized during this process.

Once a resource has been selected for deployment or put on standby, the LEDT will be notified of the specifics of the deployment and the details outlined in the REQ-A requirements.

Coordination will occur with the Advance Team to ensure operational and logistical success. The mobilization phase will be similar in nature to the US&R mobilization framework. However, clearly defined policies and procedures concerning the authority to pre-stage Advance Teams or entire LEDTs for imminent threats will need to be further developed. This includes standardized accounting forms and time sheets so that all expenses are accurately documented and tracked.

Operations

Once an event has occurred, an incident commander will determine the needs of the area. Local mutual aid agreements and intra-state agreements will continue to be the primary resource through which law enforcement support will be drawn. In situations where this is not possible, the incident commander can request the deployment of LEDT elements through established EMAC procedures.

The LEDT would report to the senior law enforcement official within the defined incident command structure. In a large incident, this would most likely be within a law enforcement branch. Key personnel from the LEDT would work closely with the incident command structure to assess needs, determine if additional LEDT elements are needed, if demobilization can occur, or if a longer period of support is envisioned. If the LEDT force will be deployed past the two-week standard deployment cycle, another LEDT would be mobilized to relieve the initial team. Standard policies and procedures that address logistical support of LEDTs should
be developed and exercised during training.

A detailed administrative form should be developed that details all daily activity conducted in support of the disaster, including personnel movements and activities, logistics, use of supplies, etc. Existing report formats such as the Emergency Management Daily Activity Report (EM-DAR) could be used in the development of this and other administrative forms and checklists (Appendix B). Accurate documentation will be essential to ensuring reimbursement. It will also provide an official record for future audits by either local, state or Federal entities.

**Demobilization**

Demobilization is a critical piece of the LEDT system. Once demobilization has been authorized, LEDTs will ensure that documentation is processed and coordinated prior to departure. Additionally, an inspection of equipment would occur to ensure accountability before leaving the incident area.

Upon return to the normal duty station, a formal debrief will be conducted for a detailed After Action Report. At a minimum, this report would outline lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations to the DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, which can then be disseminated and incorporated into the LEDT system. All phases of the mobilization, deployment, operations and demobilization would be addressed. Where possible, performance measures would be developed to assess each LEDT operational performance, and to act as a subsequent evaluation of the LEDT system. The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement should ultimately publish performance metrics for use in training and public reporting. Reimbursement processes and documentation would be executed judiciously upon return for each deployment.

Figure #5 graphically depicts the key steps of the LEDT system, providing a general framework for the deployment of LEDT resources. This demonstrates how LEDT policies and procedures will be integrated with team composition and organization. As additional policies and procedures are developed and as team capabilities are solidified, this model will continue to be defined. As a whole, the LEDT system provides a responsive system capable of rapidly providing law enforcement capabilities based on the needs of incident commanders.

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¹This schedule covers all rates eligible under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq.
Law enforcement agencies will always come to the aid of fellow agencies during a crisis. That tradition is the foundation for development of a national plan. The plan will be based on tactical and operational experience of the largest law enforcement agencies during major incidents in the past. The lessons learned may be analyzed and compiled by DHS for the required report to Congress.

A national LEDT program office will provide the necessary structure for such a team. The following section explores several administrative frameworks that could be used. Each addresses core, crosscutting issues associated with its development.

Funding must be identified to address readiness, planning, training, equipment and maintenance. Developing a comprehensive strategy and an administrative framework that addresses funding will be critical to the success of this program.

Existing Grant Programs

As homeland security grant funds support non-traditional public safety activities, funds specifically tied to LEDT personnel, equipment, training, and other costs could be charged to existing grant programs. By using existing mechanisms the LEDT program could be implemented immediately. Grant programs that target prevention and law enforcement activities include the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). It would be important that additional funds be allocated to avoid supplanting critical activities currently funded under these programs.

Although UASI funds generally support the largest law enforcement jurisdictions, this option would not create a stable law enforcement response force across grant cycles. UASI allocations are generated annually via Urban Area Working Groups focused on the needs of their local communities (e.g. fire, public health, law, emergency management) whereas LEDTs are a national law enforcement resource that all communities can leverage. Based on local priorities, LEDT funding across each region could vary substantially.
Using the UASI grant program could also limit participation to only certain urban jurisdictions and funds would be subject to state pass-through restrictions, potentially limiting resources available to the teams.

LETPP is specifically designed to support prevention and law enforcement focused activities - similar to intended activities under the LEDT program. DHS could add new LETPP funds that could be used specifically for the development and sustainment of LEDTs. To increase coordination, regional or multi-state grant applications could be coordinated within each state or FEMA region. This would greatly increase the coordination across LEDT regions and enhance national response readiness. However, it would be important that additional funds also be allocated to avoid supplanting currently allowable and funded activities.

**New Dedicated Grant Programs**

A new grant program could be directed specifically at law enforcement agencies participating in the LEDT program. Such a program would not be subject to state pass through restriction, ensuring that 100% of available funds are to participating agencies. Each agency would be required to coordinate planning activities within their respective state and LEDT region. A comprehensive regional investment justification would be submitted to DHS, enabling the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement and FEMA to coordinate activities nationally. A new grant program, however, would need to be formally called out and funded as a separate program in Federal legislation.

**Activation Funding & Reimbursement**

Activation funding and reimbursement for the LEDT program could be developed similar to the US&R model. Deployments could be orchestrated by DHS and participating agencies would be reimbursed for activation costs that are federally requested outside the EMAC process. This concept puts significant strain on individual agencies to manage equipment, possibly only enabling large agencies to participate. Funding and management of the LEDT program could be developed similar to other state based models with activation funding consistent with the Stafford Act and EMAC.
Next Steps

Chiefs and Sheriffs recognize that much work is to be done and they look forward to further interaction with the federal agencies which will become partners in this effort. This report serves as an introduction and proposed approach for the required study. As a foundation for Federal agencies and Congress to consider, these recommendations form a basis upon which to build the national plan.

The Office for State and Local Law Enforcement and FEMA will be conducting a comprehensive study as directed by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

Major Tasks

- Solicit input and participation from law enforcement, emergency response, homeland security and local government stakeholders;
- Establish the funding and management structure;
- Determine the most appropriate option for the management of LEDT equipment caches;
- Define equipment, personnel, training and experience requirements for each capability;
- Develop the LEDT Resource Database so that all LEDT assets can be cataloged for deployment;
- Develop policies and procedures for each step of the LEDT deployment process; and
- Develop an exercise program to test, refine and ensure that LEDT capabilities meet anticipated mission requirements.

- Report results of study back to appropriate committees of Congress.
Law Enforcement Deployment Teams

Appendix A—FEMA Typed Law Enforcement and Security Resources

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT
(Final Approved Version 10/10/2007)

Law Enforcement Resource Request Checklist

When an EMAC request is made for law enforcement resources, this checklist can be used by Requesting States, Assisting States or EMAC A-Teams in creating a precise mission request. Use of this checklist is not required but it does provide a comprehensive (but not all-inclusive) list of items relative to the deployment of law enforcement resources. These items can also be included in a REQ-A for the deployment of law enforcement resources.

1. EMAC allows officers to carry weapons in the performance of their law enforcement duties within the requesting jurisdiction or State. Note: the Law Enforcement Safety Act of 2004 allows police officers to carry weapons throughout the United States except in certain federal facilities or where prohibited by certain State laws. Any restrictions on carrying weapons in the Requesting State should be discussed prior to finalizing a REQ-A or prior to placing officers of the Assisting State into duty.

2. Officers may bring and use their regular equipment, including service weapons, tasers, baton, pepper spray and other less-than-lethal weapons, while deployed to the Requesting State or jurisdiction unless the Requesting State or jurisdiction specifically prohibits use of a particular piece of equipment or weapon. Any restrictions on the use of equipment, weapons or less-than-lethal weapons in the Requesting State or jurisdiction should be discussed prior to finalizing a REQ-A or prior to placing officers of the Assisting State into duty.

3. Officers may bring and use their radios for use while deployed to the Requesting State or jurisdiction, provided any electronic equipment will not interfere with equipment being operated by the Requesting State or jurisdiction.

4. Responding officers will wear the official uniform components and badging prescribed by their department to ensure proper identification as a law enforcement officer.

5. EMAC Article IV provides that responding officers will have the authority to detain or arrest without a warrant for all Requesting State criminal offenses occurring within their presence or view and in order to maintain and establish public peace, health or safety in the Requesting State or jurisdiction.

6. EMAC Article IV provides that responding officers will have “the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving state), duties, rights, and privileges as are afforded forces of the state in which they are performing
emergency services." The REQ-A should include a recitation of this provision. Wherever legally permissible, Requesting States and jurisdictions should have procedures in place to have responding officers sworn in by the Requesting State or jurisdiction upon arrival, granting them the same authority, rights and immunities applicable to officers of the Requesting State or jurisdiction whether established under local, state or federal law.

7. Requesting States and jurisdictions should develop, prior to a disaster, a concise summary of the state’s or jurisdiction’s use of force procedures that can be provided to responding officers prior to placing them into duty. Assisting State or jurisdiction officers will have authority to use force, including deadly force where necessary and appropriate under the circumstances in the exercise of their law enforcement authority and duties. No officer has the duty nor is required to retreat prior to the use of deadly force. The authority to use deadly force will be limited to situations where the officers are protecting themselves or a third person from serious bodily harm or death.

8. Responding State and jurisdiction officers shall be trained to the minimum standards required by their Assisting States for full-time career law enforcement officers, such as Police Officers Standards and Training (POST) or equivalent certification.

9. Officers will have full and regular standing as police officers with their departments and not be in a probationary, reserve, temporary or other lesser status with their departments. Since terminology varies from State to State, at a minimum, all responding officers will have graduated from an accredited police academy meeting the Assisting State’s training standards for full-time career law enforcement officers and will have served a minimum of two years, post-academy, as a full-time law enforcement officer. If responding officers do not meet these level of training or experience, it should be discussed and noted in the REQ-A.

10. Requesting States and jurisdictions should develop, prior to a disaster, a procedure that can be provided to responding officers prior to placing them into duty regarding the safe and efficient transportation of individuals arrested to facilities designated by the Requesting State or jurisdiction. The Requesting State or jurisdiction will provide adequate detention facilities for this purpose.

11. Responding officers will use basic forms of the Requesting State or jurisdiction. Prior to deployment or prior to placement into duty, officers of the Requesting State or jurisdiction will acquaint responding officers with the appropriate basic forms. Completed basic forms will be maintained by the Requesting State or jurisdiction and preserved pursuant to that state’s or jurisdiction’s regular procedures.

12. Responding officers will collect and preserve evidence in the manner prescribed by the officers of the Requesting State or jurisdiction.

13. Both Requesting States and jurisdictions and Assisting
States and jurisdictions should be aware that there may be additional costs after deployment related to the prosecution and trial of individuals arrested during the deployment. Assisting State or jurisdiction officers may be required to testify and Requesting States and jurisdictions should be prepared to discuss related issues at that time.

For purposes of EMAC missions, all jurisdictions should be aware of the following Articles.

- Pursuant to Article IX, any party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving such aid for any loss or damage to or expense incurred in the operation of any equipment and the provision of any service in answering a request for aid and for the costs incurred in connection with such requests; provided that any aiding party state may assume in whole or in part such loss, damage, expenses, or other cost, or may loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party state without charge or cost; and provided further, that any two or more party states may enter into supplementary agreements establishing a different allocation of costs among those states. Article VIII expenses shall not be reimbursable under this provision.

- Pursuant to Article IV, emergency forces will continue under the command and control of their regular leaders, but organizational units will come under the operational control of the emergency services authorities of the state receiving assistance.

- Pursuant to Article VIII, each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that state and representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own state.
## Appendix B—National Capital Region Proposed Typing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource: Canine Teams – Law Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category: Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Capabilities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments: Different types of certification, depending upon the type of working dog (bombs, drug sniffing, patrol, tracking &amp; trailing, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Appendix C—Emergency Daily Action Report

**Note:** This report must be attached to your PAR to receive reimbursement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/Status</th>
<th>Unit Code</th>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Employee ID:**

**Employee Name:**

**Control #: 0095833**

**Miami-Dade County Law Enforcement Deployment Teams**
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE EMERGENCY DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT

1. This form is to be completed on a daily basis for all employees performing services due to emergencies.

2. The crew supervisor should complete only one form per job number for materials and services used by an entire crew of employees.

3. The employee should sign, date and submit this form to the supervisor on a daily basis for review and signature.

4. Enter the date work was performed, occupational title, user code, department/division location number and employee ID number.

TIME

1. JOB NUMBER—Enter the job number, if the department has an existing job/project/work order system use the number assigned.

2. LOCATION DESCRIPTION—Enter the site within the County where the work was done. Use a specific address if known or the nearest street intersection.

3. DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED—Describe the work being performed. Be as descriptive as possible.

4. HOURS—Enter the number of hours worked that are emergency related. Use REG for regular work hours and OT for overtime hours worked. Any hours worked in excess of normal hours that are emergency related should be recorded as overtime.

EQUIPMENT

1. JOB NUMBER—Enter the job number from the time section above that corresponds to the equipment used.

2. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION—Enter the description of the equipment used. Be as descriptive as possible and include horsepower, tonnage, cubic yards or other specific information identifying equipment.

3. EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER—Enter the vehicle number or Miami-Dade County equipment number, or the serial number of the piece of equipment if leased or rented.

4. MILEAGE/HOURS—Enter the mileage for vehicles (ambulances, buses, pickup trucks) and hours for other vehicles and equipment.

5. UNIT—Enter the unit of measure, either M for miles or H for hours.

6. COST CODE—Enter the FEMA Cost Code as published on FEMA's Schedule of Equipment rates.

MATERIALS/SERVICES

1. JOB NUMBER—Enter the job number from the time section above that corresponds to the materials/services used.

2. MATERIAL/SERVICE DESCRIPTION—Enter the description of the materials or services used. Be as descriptive as possible.

3. SOURCE/VENDOR—Enter the source, INV if the County inventory, or vendor name if purchased. If unknown, leave blank.

4. UNITS USED—Enter the quantity of item(s) used.

5. UNITS—Enter the unit of measure of item(s) used. Refer to the codes below for the proper unit category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Square Yard</th>
<th>SY</th>
<th>Linear Foot</th>
<th>LF</th>
<th>Lump Sum</th>
<th>LS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cubic Yard</td>
<td>CY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>JB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square Foot</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Miles</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hour</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Board Feet</td>
<td>BF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>